Micro-Historical Perspectives on Moral Choice : Case Studies from Early Modern Portugal by Carvalho, Joaquim de
  
Micro-Historical Perspectives on Moral Choice: Case Studies
from Early Modern Portugal
Joaquim de Carvalho
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra
joaquim@dei.uc.pt
Abstract
Moral choice is often discussed in the context of  conforming to  religious norms, with immoral
behavior  explained  as  a  consequence of  imperfect  indoctrination  or  a  lack of  control  and
dissuasion mechanisms by the church and other institutions that promote moral concepts. Our
findings point in a different direction: moral choice in sexual matters seems to be the result of an
equation that relates the perception of the alternative paths of action, the place of the individual
in networks of relations and resources and various trade-offs. It is a question of strategy, at a
personal or small group level,  and less a  question of  belief.  We use intensive cross-linking  of
sources to reconstruct individual biographies and networks of relations to gain a micro-historical
view on a  set of  case studies involving public sinners in a  Portuguese parish in the 17th and
18th  centuries.  By placing  individual cases in  the context of  individual life cycles  and  in  the
context of  family and  social relations,  we gain  relevant insights into  motivations for immoral
behavior and its role in personal strategies.
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Introduction
The  study  of  moral  conformism  in  past  populations  is  an  important  field  for  the
comprehension  of  pre-industrial  societies,  especially  in  the  area  of  demographic
behavior.  To  pose  the  problem succinctly,  the  existence  of  the  European  Marriage
Pattern, characterized by late marriage and high levels of definitive celibacy, implies that
past  populations  had the  capacity  to  control  sexual  behavior  in  the  period  between
puberty  and late  marriage  (Hajnal,  1965).  The  most  cost-efficient  way  to  control  the
behavior of millions of persons was to have them believe that it was fundamentally wrong
to  engage  in  sexual  activities  before  marriage  and  thus  obtain  the  self-control  and
restraint necessary for the late marriage system to work as a regulator of demographic
growth,  in  an  epoch  when  contraception  was  not  diffused.  Moral  conformism  was
therefore an integral part of pre-industrial societies. Church and civil authorities provided
the  concepts,  control  and  repression  necessary  to  shape  individual  behavior  in  the
necessary  direction.  Industrialization  would  melt  the  cement  that  held  together  this
self-regulating mechanism.  Free  from the  economic,  social  and mental  constraints  of
traditional  peasant  societies,  the  new  generations  adopted  behaviors  that  made
illegitimacy  ratios  increase  all  over  Europe,  until  the  decline  of  fertility  brought  by
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contraception (Shorter, 1975).
It  has been argued that  a  significant  part  of the  immoral  behavior that  did occur in
pre-industrial  Portugal  was in fact part of a process that had marriage as the ultimate
goal (Laslett,  1980a: 1-65). Couples would engage in sexual contact in contexts where
they were hoping that a marriage would follow and abstain in other circumstances. This
would explain the mysterious relationship between nuptiality and illegitimacy: the more
intense  the  marriage  activity  the  more  illegitimate  births  occurred  because  the
probability of a couple having sex was linked to the perceived probability that marriage
was possible,  thus increasing competition between candidates,  while  if marriage  was
difficult  due  to  economic  circumstances  couples  would  abstain  from risky  behavior,
resulting in low nuptiality  and low illegitimacy.  There is strong statistical  evidence to
support this (Schellekens, Jona, 1995).
But  many  situations  of illegitimacy  cannot  be  traced to  courtship  practices,  nor  can
pre-nuptial  relations be considered a widespread behavior across all  social  strata.  This
leads to a central question: was there a “bastardy prone sub society”, or, in other words,
can moral misconduct be linked to specific social groups (Laslett, 1980b)?
We examine these questions with a micro-historical approach that is intended to look in
detail into cases of immoral sexual behavior that have reached us through documentation
from the  ecclesiastical  judiciary.  Our  purpose  is  to  inquire  into  moral  choice  among
individuals in an Early Modern Portuguese parish. Our starting point is the cases of moral
misbehavior  brought  before  episcopal  justice  during  episcopal  visitations.  We  then
retrace the persons involved through a variety of sources, the most relevant of which are
the  parish registers.  As much biographical  and relational  information as possible  was
collected to shed light on the context in which the observed behavior took place.  The
results are,  for some of the cases,  detailed biographies and networks of relations that
provide insights into patterns of behavior and allow us to gain unexpected perspectives
on  individual  and  group  strategies.  The  close-up  view  of  individual  trajectories  and
networks does not fit easily into the macro-level explanatory framework outlined above.
As with other micro-historical studies, it is hard to find the great causal mechanisms of
history  at  work  and  the  problem of articulating  micro  and  macro  level  explanations
becomes central.
Defining and assessing moral conformism
Episcopal visitations (Visitas Pastorais) in Portugal provide abundant source material for
studying  moral  behavior.  For  centuries,  the  episcopal  visitors  traveled  to  the  most
remote  parishes of Portuguese  dioceses and,  with great  ceremony,  would gather the
population together, select a number of them, seemingly at random, and ask them, under
oath and threat of excommunication, to denounce the public sinners they knew of. The
transcripts of these interrogations, sometimes full of exuberant detail, have survived in
large numbers in the diocese of Coimbra, and are known as devassas, from the juridical
term applied to an inquiry that is undertaken without prior knowledge that a crime has
been  committed.  It  is  a  unique  form of  documentation,  as  far  as  we  know,  in  the
European context, mainly because of its ex officio nature and the random nature of the
interrogations (Carvalho 1990).
The uniqueness of the Visitas Pastorais in Portugal, far from being the bureaucratic and
administrative exercise they became in other countries, can be traced to a jurisdictional
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division of labor,  between the bishops and secular judiciary.  A series of circumstances
and political  contexts  developing the  reception of the  Tridentine  decrees in Portugal
created  the  figure  of  the  mixti  fiori  case,  a  crime  that  simultaneously  fell  under
ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction and that was to be handled by the juridical system
that first learned of the event. Among these, moral cases were, for many decades, the
most  frequently  denounced.  Within this  category,  we  find mainly  illicit  relationships,
couples living together or having occasional intercourse without being married, but also
prostitution,  encouraging or facilitating prostitution (panderism),  and consenting to the
immoral  behavior  of  those  under  one’s  responsibility  (e.g.  parents  allowing  the
misbehavior of daughters). Note that other more relevant moral or sexual crimes, such as
bigamy or sodomy,  were not within the jurisdiction of the episcopal  courts,  but rather
came under the compass of the Inquisition.
The  jurisdictional  context  and the  ritualized practice  of the  visitation imply  that  the
question of the definition of moral behavior can be taken for granted. Individuals would
know which practices were being targeted by ecclesiastical justice. The list of cases that
would be subject to interrogation during the visitation was announced at mass on the
previous  Sunday  and  the  list  would  be  posted  on  the  church  door,  according  to
ecclesiastical manuals. We also know from the transcripts that people denouncing cases
mentioned that the guilty parties had been caught in previous visitations, whenever that
was the case.
In fact, the whole point of the devassa was to find out, through interrogation of randomly
selected persons,  what was believed to be wrong in the parish.  Central to the content
and form of the episcopal  visitation was the idea of public sinners,  those that publicly
defied the accepted norms of behavior. The public sinners were a danger to the salvation
of the souls of their fellow parishioners because the spectacle of unpunished crime drove
the spectators to misbehave themselves. So, public sins required public punishment, and
that was the main purpose of the devassa, also called the “temporal visitation”
From our point of view, it is relevant to note that the people we will be talking about had
a  clear  awareness  of  the  normative  position  of  their  behavior.  They  were  neither
involuntary  sinners,  nor people  without  a  clear awareness of the  fact  that  they  were
doing wrong. They were fully aware of the normative significance of their behavior and so
they consequently constitute a significant sample for the inquiry into the logic of moral
choice.
Methodology
The episcopal  visitations were the sources that provided us with the original  cases to
explore.  But  the  essence  of  the  methodology  used  relied  on  the  cross-linking  of
information from various origins, with parish registers playing a major role as providers of
biographical fragments. The cases analyzed in this study are thus based on information
from  episcopal  visitations,  parish  registers,  notarial  records,  varied  documentation
related to the Santa Casa da Misericórdia, marriage processes (normally brought about
by impediments raised to marriages banns) and municipal  sources.  Although the time
frame of the series varied according to the source type,  the greatest concentration of
information was found for the period from 1680 to 1720, and our cases are located inside
that time frame. The various sources were introduced into a nominal database managed
by  specially  designed  software,  which  allowed  for  the  reconstruction  of  individual
biographies and the  analysis of networks of relations (Carvalho,  1997: 287-536).  The
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methodology  has  since  been  used  in  other  studies  with  similarly  rewarding  results
(Castiço, 2003, Ribeiro, 2003).
The setting: Soure, a Portuguese parish in the eighteenth century
Soure is a parish in the center of Portugal, 30 kilometers south of Coimbra, which is the
see of the diocese. The population numbered around 3000 in the mid-18th century. Until
the 19th century, Soure was also a municipality (concelho), with a significant set of local
offices in military and civil  administration.  There was also a parish chapter (colegiada)
with six clergymen (beneficiados).
The parish covered a considerable area by the standards of the center of Portugal: around
90 square kilometers. Two rivers cut across the territory, running South to North, joining
together and merging into the Mondego river to the north of the parish. Most of the parish
is  thus  a  secondary  system of gentle  valleys  that  reproduce  the  great  plain  of the
Mondego on a smaller scale,  forming some of Portugal’s more fertile  land.  The region
consists of a series of gentle hills, rarely over 100 meters high and separated by the wide
valleys of the rivers and their offshoots.
Down in the plains,  the land is of excellent quality, fertilized by periodic floods, which,
despite  being  considerably  disruptive  of  everyday  life,  leave  behind  a  nutrient-rich
deposit  that in some places allows for the continuous cultivation of crops without the
normal rotational fallow period.
Hamlets  were  scattered  midway  between  the  river  plain  and  the  pine  forests  that
crowned the hills. The population was highly dispersed in these small agglomerates: we
found almost 500 toponymical forms for inhabited places inside the parish in the 17th  and
18th-century sources.
This territory was donated to the Knights Templar in 1128, at a time when Portugal was
yet to be born as a  nation.  Soure was part  of the frontier of Christianity  in the 12th
century and it  was the Templars’  first  base in the West of the Iberian Peninsula.  The
Templars subsequently received jurisdiction and land from the Portuguese kings,  which
they completed through acquisition and exchanges with other seigniorial lords. With the
extinction of the  Templars,  the  land and the  acquired rights were  transferred to  the
Portuguese Ordem de Cristo, which progressively gravitated to the king’s direct control.
From the  16th  century  onwards,  the  original  Templar  possessions  in  Soure  became
resources that the Portuguese kings used to reward services or ensure loyalties. Together
with  the  possessions  of  other  former  military  orders,  they  constituted  an  essential
element of the monarch’s policy under the name of comendas.
Comendas  would  be  given  to  the  nobility  in  exchange  for  distinguished  services,
especially  those  related  to  the  overseas  affairs  of  the  kingdom.  It  is  important  to
understand that a comenda was not, is this context, a clear physical entity composed of
land and associated structures. It was rather a patchwork of rights, taxes, pieces of land,
percentages on production,  means of production such as mills or waterworks,  brought
together on an ad hoc basis,  seemingly with the sole objective of constituting a round
total of revenue that had to be awarded at some moment in time.
In this setting, we can distinguish several modes of resource appropriation that help us to
understand the main social strata.
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At the first level, we find those who appropriated the prime resources generated by the
comendas:  the  comendadores.  These  were  typically  non-resident  members  of  the
administrative  nobility  who  received  comendas  in  Soure  as  payment  for  services
rendered or loyalty shown to the king. Soure’s resources would often be part of a larger
package that would add up to the amount awarded for a particular service. This meant
that the comendadores had a very distant relationship with the community: they did not
live there; there was hardly any trace of their physical presence in the territory.  They
collected their income through intermediaries, rendeiros, who might in turn further hire
out  to  local  residents  the  complex  work  of levying  the  rights,  dues  and taxes.  The
rendeiros offered the comendador a fixed cash amount for the comenda. Their profit was
proportional to their ability to collect as much as possible from the peasants living within
the bounds of the comenda.
This social  and geographical  distance of the comendadores created a space for a local
elite.  At  this  second  level,  we  find  families  with  seigniorial  mansions  as  their  main
residence. They were locally based and Soure played an important role in their long-term
strategies. Their economic ambitions were centered on occupying the posts of the local
administration,  enjoying ecclesiastical  careers and engaging in traditional  landowning
with related income from rents. The exercise of prestigious local positions was important,
not just because of the income they provided and, sometimes, the exemptions and other
privileges associated with them, but also because this activity strengthened the inclusion
of those that held these positions amongst the restricted set of those that governed a
governança.  A  significant  number of the holders of these positions therefore obtained
degrees from the University of Coimbra that allowed them to serve in both the local and,
hopefully,  central  administrations.  Others  entered  holy  orders  because  their  families
were thus able to obtain ecclesiastical sources of income, either through influence or by
direct  right  of nomination.  Amongst  the  more  important  of these,  we  can find some
families from the local nobility,  not very far removed in status from the comendadores
(they might have their own comendas elsewhere): these people stayed for long periods in
Lisbon in the royal entourage and kept themselves at a distance from local administrative
tasks, except, occasionally, for the specific role of provedor da Misericórdia (head of the
local charitable institution). But most of them were really locally based, extending their
sphere of influence through marriage outside the municipality.
Just  below  the  local  elite  belonging  to  the  governança  we  find  wealthy  farmers
(lavradores),  who managed to  send their sons into  holy  orders and,  occasionally,  to
marry their daughters into the local nobility. Some of these farmers were closely related
to the collection of rents and taxes of the comendas and played an important role in the
social networks through which resources flowed.
Below  them,  we  find  the  laborers  (seareiros,  trabalhadores  de  enxada),  and  poor
farmers, who provided the underlying labor force.
Artisans and local commerce existed on a limited scale (barbers, blacksmiths, carpenters,
pharmacists/boticas, tailors, shoemakers) with individuals often combining some sort of
agricultural  economic activity  with the  exercise  of a  craft  or trade.  Of some  specific
importance in terms of resource flow were the " almocreves”, men that transported goods
on carts or horseback and constituted a well-defined group inside the community.
The cases
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Our set of case studies is based on a number of illicit couples denounced in the course of
episcopal visitations. Some cases stand on their own; others form a cluster of situations
with recurrent patterns of behavior. In all the cases, the cross-linking of sources and the
reconstruction of networks allowed for  insights  into  strategies  that  involved immoral
behavior, either at the individual level or as part of what seem to be shared strategies in
some social groups.
Concubines and Godfathers, resources and immorality
Our  first  example  attempts  to  clarify  a  recurrent  pattern  that  emerges  when
reconstructing the network that existed around some illicit couples: where we have an
illicit relationship between a man and a woman we often find that someone in the man’s
family was godfather or godmother to someone in the woman’s family.  This interesting
phenomenon allows us to propose that immoral behavior can be understood as part of
wider relational strategies that allowed for the flow of resources between different social
groups.
Figure  1 shows couples involved in concubinage  and adultery  in the  context  of their
immediate  kin.  It  also  shows  spiritual  kinship  ties  created  in  baptism through  the
“godfathering” or “godmothering” of children.  Locating the illicit  couples (gray symbols
connected by U-shaped arrows) and the “godparenthood” relations (dotted lines) should
make the pattern easily observable.
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These  spiritual  kinship  relations  have  a  specific  direction:  they  always  connect  a
godfather or godmother in the family of the man involved in the illicit relationship to a
child in the family of his female partner.  It  is important to note this fact because the
reverse never happens: we never find a person in the family of a woman involved in an
illicit relationship who is either godfather or godmother to someone in her lover’s family.
To make the  pattern clear,  let  us go through the  three  networks shown in Figure  1,
describing the underlying cases. Case A involves José da Cunha, a married man from a
well-known family of the community, and Maria, the daughter of Manuel Rodrigues, the
barber  of the  small  hamlet  close  to  Jose’s  house.  They  were  denounced  during  the
visitation of 1694. Neighbors declared that he was frequently seen in the barber’s house
at  night,  making a  loud noise with guitars,  the reason for this behavior being Maria.
There were rumors that she was pregnant with his child and had decided of her own free
will to leave for Lisbon (Carvalho, 1997: 53-107).
When the case was brought to the attention of the visitador in 1694, the witnesses were
describing events that had occurred some time earlier, one or two years before, probably.
In  1692,  José  was  godfather  to  Maria’s  most  recent  brother,  named  José  after  the
godfather.  The presence of José da Cunha at  the baptism of the young José is either
contemporary to the affair he was having with Maria or it could be,  if we accept some
historical  guesswork,  the event that triggered Jose’s interest.  Obviously we will  never
know,  but  the  point  is  not  the  role  of this  baptism in  the  sequence  of events  that
originated an illicit relationship. The point is rather the topos, the simultaneous presence
of an illicit couple and a kinship relation of that type. As we move to other cases, we see
that the details vary greatly but that a basic pattern emerges.
Moving to case B, we see the same structural pattern in another situation, which is very
different in its details. In 1692, António Cordeiro and his wife Francisca Nunes (not shown
in Figure 1) were denounced for panderism. They “provided” women to various men of the
community  in their  own house  or in the  residence  of the  clients.  Men named by  the
witnesses included wealthy and important persons of Soure.
Among the witnesses, there appears a certain Maria de Jesus, aged 22, telling a strange
story: her sister,  Madalena,  was abducted by  António  Cordeiro  and taken to  Manuel
Homem de Quadros, a member of the local gentry, with whom she remained for 11 or 12
days. Cordeiro broke a lock of a door behind which Madalena’s father had shut Madalena,
“to avoid her being deceived (enganada)”. Another sister of Madalena and Maria de Jesus,
named Juliana,  who also testified in the devassa,  confirmed these facts.  The visitador
then called the father of the three girls,  Manuel  Gonçalves Vargas,  who confirmed the
disappearance  of  his  daughter  for  a  period  of  time  but  carefully  avoided  direct
denunciation of either António Cordeiro or Manuel  Homem de Quadros,  saying that he
had heard those names in relation to the girl’s absence but could not remember from
whom he  had  heard  them,  and  that  he  had  no  further  information.  He  stated  his
profession as a laborer (trabalhador) and could hardly write his name at the bottom of the
testimony.
Why was Madalena locked up by her father? Because it was not the first time she had
been involved in scandal and denunciations in visitations. In 1686, six years before the
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episode of the broken lock, Madalena had been denounced as a woman of bad behavior
(mal procedida) and promiscuous relations (devassa do seu corpo).  Six years later, her
father kept her locked inside the house, but in vain.
We know that we are,  again,  confronted with a situation of social  imbalance.  Manuel
Homem de Quadros belonged to one of the families of the local gentry. He was single at
the time of his involvement with Madalena and had registered an illegitimate child from
another girl shortly before that. Soon afterwards, in 1693, he was to marry a woman of
good family and become one of the more prominent men of Soure. Just like José da Cunha
in the previous case,  this was a case of a young male from an important family found
engaging in illicit relations with women of a lower status.
We  can  find  no  trace  of  spiritual  kinship  between  Manuel  Homem de  Quadros  and
Madalena’s family before the case appeared in the devassa. But we find the link later on.
Madalena had a brother, with the same name as their father: Manuel Gonçalves Vargas.
Manuel is an interesting case of social mobility (analyzed in Carvalho, 1997: 139-150). He
was to nurture a close relationship with another important family of Soure, the Soares
Coelho  family,  and under their  patronage  succeed in accessing increasingly  elevated
posts in local administration. Manuel chose the godparents of his seven children carefully,
consolidating a network of spiritual  kinship with the Soares Coelho family,  present at
every one of their baptisms.  But he occasionally diversified his alliances and selected
Manuel Homem de Quadros as godfather to his son, António, in 1707. The person alleged
to have entertained his sister for 12 days in 1692 became the spiritual kin of Manuel. So,
here the pattern assumes the following form: a man involved in an illicit relationship with
a woman was godfather to her nephew.
Case  C  provides  more  complex  variants  of  the  same  theme.  Two  brothers,  Manuel
Marques and António Mendes,  were involved with three women,  two of them married.
The denunciations occurred in 1705 (Manuel) and 1708 (António). Manuel and António’s
family was part of the local governança and the two young men played an important role
in the collection of the comendas’ income.
We find here the complex network of dependencies that emerged around the collection of
the comendas’ rents on behalf of the comendadores. António was the rendeiro of one of
the comendas and his brother had close relations with other rendeiros, one of whom was
godfather to his illegitimate son.  On the other side of the illicit  relationship,  we have
women who were the daughters or wives of almocreves and laborers.  Almocreves and
laborers would naturally be employed by the rendeiro to collect and transport the goods
that  constituted the  rents.  Factual  information on this  is  found in the  denunciations:
António Mendes, rendeiro, was accused of sending Manuel Gonçalves, almocreve, to do
business on his behalf, so that he (António Mendes) could illicitly visit the wife of Manuel
Gonçalves without difficulty.
We  find  in  our  sources  varied  traces  of  the  networks  that  connected  rendeiros,
almocreves and plain trabalhadores de enxada (hoers).  It was through these networks
that the drainage of the local resources towards the absent comendadores occurred. But
the outward flow of resources coincided with a counter flow in which the rendeiros got
their share of the rents, and paid the almocreves and the laborers. Their contract with the
comendadores would have set a fixed amount of money. If they collected more, it was
their profit; if they collected less, it might spell ruin. So it was crucial to collect and sell:
that was where laborers and almocreves became crucial.
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The business of collecting rents was a hazardous one. Every year the comendadores could
put up new contracts, asking for new bids from rendeiros. The profitability of the process
was closely dependent on unpredictable natural, and sometimes social, events. Efficiency
in collecting the fruits of the land and selling them quickly was crucial for the rendeiros,
and hence their dependency on a network of reliable almocreves and trabalhadores. The
former, on the other hand, could not afford to be left out of the circuit and would naturally
cherish good relations with the latter.
It is a fragment of these networks that we have captured in case C of Figure 1.  Again,
spiritual kinship is found between the families of the persons involved in concubinage and
adultery. Again, the direction of the spiritual kinship is the same: someone in the close
family of the  manis godfather or godmother to a child in the close family of the woman.
We see  an overlap between the  spiritual  kinship network  and the  flow of resources.
“Godfatherhood” and “godmotherhood” go in the same direction as the part of the rents
that  stays  in  the  community,  what  we  could  call  the  “local  margin”.  Women  in
concubinage and adultery move in the opposite direction.
This is more than just an elaborate way to say that affluent men attracted,  or forced
themselves upon, women in economic need. The fact that spiritual kinship links matched
the  flow  of  resources  and  the  provision  of  women  for  illicit  relations  introduced  a
dimension of symmetry or reciprocity. We take it for granted that asking someone to be
the godfather or godmother of one’s child was a voluntary act that arose from the desire
to formalize an existing relationship or to propitiate a desired one. We also take it for
granted and proved by the available data, that no one chose as godfather or godmother
to their child someone that they considered of inferior status. It was either a horizontal
choice or an “upward-looking choice”. This is a pattern that we find in several countries
and epochs (Gunnlaugsson and Guttormsson, 2000; Ericsson, 2000), but not everywhere
at all times. For instance, in Renaissance Florence, it was the other way around (Haas,
1995). So the bond that was created or reinforced in that way was a voluntary expression
of relative social positioning. In a way, the father of the child was saying to the family
from which he was asking for a godparent: “we know that we are less than you are and
therefore we put ourselves under your protection by offering our services.” The traditional
ritual of saluting a godfather, by kissing his hand and asking for benediction, was clearly
a symbol of submission (Silva, 1989: 866). Used in this way, spiritual kinship could be
considered a compensating phenomenon, that diminished social distances by creating a
link of protection and dependency (Calliert-Boisvert,  1968: 99).  The channel  that was
thus opened was bi-directional: there was value or gratification flowing in both directions.
There was obviously no causal relationship between spiritual kinship and illicit relations.
They were both expressions of a reciprocal process by which actors at different levels in
the social hierarchy established channels that propitiated an exchange of resources.
If we consider the nature of the illicit relations that we have before us in the context of
the recurrent pattern of reciprocal flows, we must conclude that “morality” was not really
a central concern here. What was happening at the moral level was closely linked to the
fabric of social strategies in the struggle to obtain the best possible position in networks
through which resources flowed.
To sin or not to sin: a tale of two sisters
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The previous examples and their context seem to point to a socially determined behavior
regarding sexual  mores: men from higher social  strata  engaged in relationships with
women of lower status and the context seems to indicate that these relationships were
part of a plethora of reciprocal exchanges. In our interpretation, however, it is rather the
way an immoral behavior was used as part of an overall strategy that is relevant. The
social  imbalance  of  the  people  involved  constitutes  one  specific  background,  among
others, against which strategies were deployed. We can find illicit relations as a strategy
in  socially  horizontal  situations.  The  case  we  are  about  to  present  is  apparently  a
confirmation of Laslett’s “courtship hypothesis”, but at the same time it suggests that the
same social and family context can produce very different behavior.
The case consists of a triangular relationship between a José Rodrigues, Josefa Espírito
Santo and Maria Francisca. José had promised to marry Josefa, but changed his mind and
decided to wed Maria instead. The story reaches us through the legal proceeding started
by Josefa to prevent José from marrying the other girl in 1716(Arquivo da Universidade de
Coimbra, Processos de casamento, José Rodrigues e Maria Francisca, 1716). She came
forward with a complaint made on the basis of "public honesty". Her argument was that
José had publicly promised to marry her, not Maria. By failing to keep his promises, he
was obliged to compensate her, as stipulated by Canon Law (Bride, 1965).
The episode is interesting for our argument for two reasons: firstly because we obtain
from the process,  mainly  through Josefa’s own testimony,  an insight  into how sexual
activity was associated with the process leading to marriage; secondly, by reconstructing
Josefa’s social background, we gain an understanding of the constraints that led Josefa to
fall into José's seductive trap.
According to Josefa’s allegations in the case, José had promised marriage to her and with
that promise had had "all he wanted" from her ("teve dela o que quiz”). Witnesses heard
in  the  inquiry  declared  that  they  knew  they  had  an  illicit  relationship,  using  the
expression "tracto illícito”. No one actually witnessed the promise of marriage but it was
assumed that marriage was what the couple had in mind because they were "both equal
in blood and wealth".  Although José  denied ever making promises to Josefa,  another
witness stated that “it was understood that if they had copulated with one another the
plaintiff would not have consented [to that] without a promise of marriage”.
Josefa described her relationship with José to the parish priest who was registering the
complaint. She talked about how she believed José, how she had given herself to him,
how  he  would  come  and  go  from her  house  as  he  wanted.  She  also  detailed  the
successive excuses that José gave to delay the promised marriage: “he said he didn’t
have a proper coat and needed to borrow money from an uncle to buy one”; months later
“he said the price of grain was too high”, and so on. It is hard to avoid the thought, just
by reading the transcript, that one believes what one wants to believe.
The marriage process does not give much information about the context of Josefa or José.
But by cross-linking it with other sources we are able to reconstruct enough fragments of
Josefa’s life. Josefa’s father died in 1700 when Josefa was 14. She had a younger sister
named Joana,  who was 11 at  the  time.  In 1712,  Joana applied for the  dowry  of the
Misericórdia, a prize of 15,000  réisthat the confraternity awarded each year to a female
orphan of poor origin in order to facilitate her marriage. She got the dowry and married
that same year, at the age of 23. Josefa remained single at the age of 26.
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Four years went by and Josefa was still unmarried. She would never get the dowry of the
Misericórdia  for  herself  because  the  confraternity  would  not  give  twice  to  the  same
family. So the fortune of her sister was, in a way, her misfortune. When José appeared in
her life,  she  was a  poor woman,  aged  30,  whose  chances  of marriage  were  quickly
disappearing. She believed José’s promises and accepted pre-marital sex clearly because
in her mind, and in the minds of her neighbors who came to testify, it cemented the bond
and made the promise stronger.
This case is illustrative of the factors that affect moral choice in two areas. The first one
relates to the social environment of the actors involved. Both Joana and Josefa had the
same social position. They shared the same difficulties, needs and constraints. But their
trajectory was very different from the point of view of an observer of moral behavior. One
followed  the  path  of  virtue,  marrying,  with  the  pious  dowry,  in  the  church  of  the
Misericórdia,  where  no  other  marriages  took  place.  Josefa,  on  the  other  hand,  was
seduced and abandoned,  sinning publicly and confessing everything to the priest after
hearing the announcement of her misfortune in the banns of another girl’s marriage. Yet,
as individuals,  they were doing the same thing: fighting against the curse of celibacy
inexorably attracted by poor orphan girls.  We can think of them as interchangeable,  if
chance had decreed otherwise: if Josefa had gotten the dowry, maybe Joana would have
ended up with the alternative of less than strict morals.
The second factor that it is interesting to note is how institutions like the Misericórdia and
the church courts operated in this environment.  The dowry of the Misericórdia is seen
here to fulfil its role perfectly: by endowing orphan girls they would preserve their virtue
and keep them away from sin. The dowry seems to have been created in a social context
in which the upper class, which created the dowry by donation, was fully aware of what
lay in store for a poor orphan girl in terms of a strategy for survival. Their virtue was at
stake and the cases we have described so far fully confirm this: immoral behavior was an
integral  part of strategies that bridged the gap between classes and allowed for some
flow of resources towards the more needy. The betrothal and the related impeachment of
“public honesty” was also a strategy to secure acceptable moral behavior in a context of
late  marriage,  where conformity  to moral  rules required a  very  long period of sexual
abstinence  and  a  related  risk  of  remaining  single.  The  betrothal  reduced  the  risk
associated with the late age of marriage, by creating a commitment between two persons
who were not able to marry, normally for economic reasons. It also provided a setting
where some forms of intimacy might occur more easily, but our impression here is that
pre-marital sex occurred in contexts where marriage was believed to be imminent.
The view from above: the toleration of immoral behavior in the upper classes
In the cases above that linked spiritual kinship to immoral behavior, we not only obtained
insights into the relational  strategies of the  lower social  groups,  but  also formed the
impression that social inequalities were exploited by men from wealthy families in order
to obtain sexual favors. It is important to mention now that this type of behavior did not
seem to meet with any significant condemnation from inside the “community”. Evidence
shows that instead it amounted to public, and indeed not infrequent, behavior.
One of the most  striking examples of how,  up to a point,  the immoral  conduct  of an
upper-class man was accepted by his family was the case of José da Cunha (mentioned
above in another context) and Isabel Rodrigues. Their relationship left a long trail in the
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sources, from their initial denunciation in a visitation of 1692 to their final sentencing to
imprisonment in 1737. José was a member of the local nobility and Isabel, the daughter
of a laborer, was designated a “poor girl” in the sources. In 1692, José was denounced for
keeping Isabel in a house at his own expense, “with all that is necessary”, for more than
6 years. They were both single at the time and had baptized a child in 1691, with José
acknowledging paternity.  As we  have  seen before,  José  was involved in other cases
around that time.
José married Inês Galvão de Melo, the daughter of a member of the governança in 1693,
shortly  after his first  incrimination with Isabel.  But  his behavior did not  change  with
marriage and, as we have seen above, he was denounced in the visitation of 1694 for his
relationship with Maria, the daughter of the local barber. He was also denounced again in
the same visitation for continuing his relationship with Isabel, “who he keeps at hand in
some houses of his,  close  to  this estate,  at  his expense,  buying her clothes,  shoes,
everything she needs…’ In the visitation of September 1694, the witnesses talked about
the existence of three children of the couple, and one Jorge Luís informed the visitador
that “the accused is said to have arranged for her marriage with a kinsman of hers and
was obtaining a dispensation in Rome for that purpose”.
We can confirm the denunciations of an eminent “arranged” marriage for Isabel.  In the
parish registers, we find that Isabel married a certain António Francisco, a few months
later,  on December 22nd,  1694.  And we also find that Isabel  married pregnant with a
child that would be baptized on May 8th, 1695, and that the father of the child was José
da Cunha. He had baptized his first legitimate child two months before in March of the
same year.  So,  Isabel  was five  months pregnant  with José’s child when she  married
António in December 1694.
The interesting point here is that José assumed paternity in the child’s baptismal register.
This  implies  that  the  purpose  of  the  arranged  marriage  was  not  to  conceal  the
relationship,  which would have been the main priority in England at that time (Quaife,
1979: 104-123). But even more striking are the names of the other people present at the
baptism of this illegitimate child of two married persons: the godmother was D. Maria da
Cunha, the mother of José da Cunha, and the priest who celebrated the act was Teodósio
Mendes, the brother of José’s wife.1 Teodósio was not the vicar of the parish and just took
part in ceremonies involving closely related kin, at the commission of the vicar. It was
also he who had baptized José’s legitimate child two months earlier. In the same spirit of
non-concealment of the true nature of the relations involved, a distinguished member of
José’s family,  D.  Tomás de  Moscoso,  was witness to  the  arranged marriage  between
Isabel and António.
From 1695 onwards,  José and Inês,  on the one hand,  and Isabel  and António,  on the
other,  baptized  successive  children,  with  there  being  no  confusion  about  Antonio’s
paternity,  at  least  in  the  baptism records.  The  next  visitations  brought  no  further
denunciations.
But,  behind  the  apparent  normality,  we  have  occasional  evidence  that  the  distance
between the two worlds was not that great.  In 1700,  José would be a witness to the
marriages of Catarina and Manuel,  Isabel’s sister and brother. And we know almost for
certain that they were together at least once at the baptism of the illegitimate child of a
foreign couple, in September, 1707, when Isabel was the godmother and Rodrigo, the 12
year-old son of José and Inês, was the godfather.
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The story of José and Isabel does not end here. In 1708, they  were widowed within a few
months of each other.  And a  troubled new period of their  lives began because  they
decided to marry, a decision that would trigger an impeachment process from both José’s
family  and  his  late  wife’s  relatives.  One  of his  nephews and  his  father-in-law  came
forward when the banns were published saying that the marriage was impossible because
it was incestuous.
The  argument  of the  impeachment  was that  José  had fornicated with one  of Isabel’s
sisters and also with Isabel’s mother. If this was true, there was incest in the first degree
of affinity, raising an impediment that prevented the marriage. The case was long and full
of episodes, but it is clear that José and Isabel had openly resumed their relationship (if
they  had  ever  really  interrupted  it).  They  were  not  able  to  marry  because  the
ecclesiastical  court  decided  against  them.  The  case  became  public  and  they  were
denounced again in the visitations of 1712 and 1713.
In 1718,  another striking event left its mark in the parish registers: a son of José and
Isabel, named João Homem da Cunha, married a girl who was the godchild of his father.
The  new  couple  had  a  child  five  months  after  marriage.  José  and  Isabel  were  now
grandparents.  The interesting point is that the godfather of this child would be José’s
legitimate son, Manuel. Again José closes the circle, using spiritual kinship to knit his two
separate worlds closer together.
We find José and Isabel still being denounced in 1736, 44 years after the first time that
their story had been registered in a devassa. In 1737, the Episcopal Court aggregated all
the  accumulated sins and sentenced both of them to be expelled from Soure,  she to
Miranda in the north-east and he to the Algarve in the extreme south. They could not be
further apart now, and at this point we lose them from our sources.
There are many interesting dimensions in this long story, very much abbreviated here,
but the one that most interests us is the way in which José and Isabel were integrated
into  the  social  networks  to  which  they  belonged.  We  have  seen the  family  of José
participating in acts relating to his parallel life with Isabel and symmetrically José and his
relatives  being  present  as  godparents  and  witnesses  at  baptisms  and  marriages  of
Isabel’s family. We have seen not only José’s family but also his wife’s family involved in
ceremonies related to his other immoral life. In all this, we find no sign of condemnation
or distancing from the “community”. Punishment comes from the outside world, through
the visitations.
The problems started with the attempted marriage. It was not the illicit relationship that
was a  problem; it  was the  idea  of making it  legitimate  that  was scandalous.  José’s
lawyer, in the impeachment process, would argue that by marrying Isabel he was saving
his soul and repairing the great damage he had done to her honor and virtue over the
years.  But  that  virtuous  interpretation  was  certainly  completely  irrelevant  to  José’s
family and to the family of his late wife.
To  make  sense  of  this,  one  has  to  look  into  the  legal  framework  regulating  the
transmission of property  inside and outside marriage (for an overview in English,  see
Brettell,  1991).  In  Portugal,  unless  otherwise  established  by  pre-nuptial  agreement,
there was community of property in a marriage and everything brought into it,  and all
that  was  acquired  afterwards,  became  the  joint  property  of the  couple.  Each of the
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spouses could dispose freely of a third of his/her half of the common property to donate or
leave in a will. The other two thirds would be divided between the existing children or, in
the  absence  of these,  amongst  the  next  of kin.  When one  of the  spouses died,  the
surviving  one  remained  as  head  of the  household,  managing  the  common property,
distributing  the  half  corresponding  to  the  deceased  amongst  the  respective  heirs.
(Ordenações Filipinas, liv. IV, tit. XLVI, XCV).
The law also regulated the transmission of property either to concubines (barregãs in the
terminology of the Ordenações) or to illegitimate offspring. If a married man transmitted
any type of good to a woman (as a gift, donation, sale or by any other means – presumed
thefts were also contemplated) with whom he had afeição carnal (carnal affection),  his
legitimate wife had the right to demand the return of the good, which would then become
her own private and full  property (Ordenações Filipinas,  liv.  IV,  tit.  LXVI).  Illegitimate
children counted as heirs only if their father was a peão (foot soldier, not a knight). If the
father was a noble (cavaleiro / knight), illegitimate offspring had no rights, except if, in
the absence of any legitimate heirs, their father named them in his will (liv. IV, tit. XCII).
To circumvent this disposition it was necessary to ask the king to legitimate a natural
son.  The law also considered that children born out of wedlock could be legitimated a
posteriori  if  their  parents  married  after  their  birth,  with  implications  for  inheritance
purposes, at least of property donated by the king (liv. 2, tit. 35, par. 12).
In this context,  the upper-class families that were considered to be of noble condition,
like the ones mentioned above, risked little with their men’s immoral behavior. Bastards
were out of the line of succession,  and any significant gifts to the concubines could be
reclaimed by the legitimate wife or her heirs.  This explains the apparent tolerance of
José’s family towards Isabel.  And it also explains why the marriage between José and
Isabel was unacceptable. The daughter of the laborer from Sobral would not inherit from
the  da  Cunha  family.  But  the  solution  must  be  found  inside  the  same  ideological
framework that allowed two adults to marry of their own free will.  The impeachment of
affinity by illicit copulation was easy to insinuate, since it required no more than a few
witnesses. The church thus became an instrument of family strategies.
 José's  relationship  with Isabel  was not  atypical.  We  find  several  other  examples  of
members of the elite and the governança involved with women of lower status. A very
similar  situation  occurred  around  1688  with  Sebastião  Machado  da  Costa,  later  a
vereador (member of the municipal  council) and commissar of the Inquisition.  He was
denounced together with a certain Mariana do Rosário, who married another man while
maintaining her relationship with Sebastião.  According to a witness to the devassa  of
1688,  Mariana’s husband ended up leaving the parish.  We saw before António Mendes
and Manuel  Marques,  the  sons of another vereador,  having illegitimate  children and
adulterous affairs. Manuel Homem de Quadros, later provedor of the Misericórdia, had an
illegitimate child before marriage. In one spectacular example of moral cynicism, another
provedor of the Misericórdia, D. Pedro de Meneses, was denounced in 1694 for buying the
virginity  of a  girl  from her  father,  a  poor  seasonal  migrant  worker,  for  15,000 réis,
claiming that it was the same amount as the dowry that the Misericórdias gave to orphan
girls.  He took the girl  for a couple of weeks and then returned her home.  One has to
admire the razor-sharp reasoning: by taking away her virginity he was destroying her
chances of future marriage,  so a good estimate of the value of what was lost was the
amount  locally  given  to  girls  that  no  one  wanted  to  marry  in  order  to  make  them
acceptable brides (Carvalho, 1997: 125-137).
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From the testimony  in the  devassas,  and especially  the  fact  that  those men actually
recognized their illegitimate children at  baptism,  we infer that their behavior was not
hidden from the public. On the contrary, it was not far from being ostentatious, with the
women often being placed in houses belonging to their lovers,  and clearly showing off
their material comfort to their neighbors.
From the men’s perspective, this could be a way to assert their status and manhood and
to  ensure  that  they  had  descendants,  who  might  be  absent  from a  future  marriage
arranged by the family. In a community where inclusion in the ruling elite was based on
social  recognition,  public displays of status and quality  were fundamental.  From their
families’  perspective, it was a situation whose side effects in relation to their interests
were closely controlled by law. To the women involved, it was a way out of poverty.
Conclusion
Putting our findings in the context of a general framework that defines the effect of moral
values on sexuality in a pre-industrial society is not an easy task. Like so many micro-
historical inquiries,  the image that emerges from the reconstruction of individual cases
enhances  the  explanatory  value  of  strategies  in  a  complex  network  of  relations,
constraints  and  personal  trajectories  and  leaves  in  the  dark  the  larger  variables
governing the operation of society’s mechanisms. What we see is that moral behavior is
one  element,  among  others,  of  adaptive  strategies  aimed  at  achieving  the  desired
outcomes of individuals and families. Similar findings, in the sense that close-up analysis
fails to be linked easily with overarching theories of change or social determinism, have
been found in studies of illegitimacy  in Scotland in the  19th century  (Blaikie,  1995),
single  mothers  in  Sweden  around  the  same  time  (Brändström,  1996),  and  in  other
aspects related to demographic transition (Schlumbohm, 1996).
The  relevant  conclusion,  in  our  view,  is  that  immoral  behavior,  as  defined  by  the
regularised  institution  of  episcopal  visitations,  is  heavily  determined  by  the  social
environment, but not in an automatic and simplistic way. The role of institutional, social
and economic levels is only comprehensible by reconstructing the actual social networks
that surround actors and the ways in which each of the players adapts to the strategies of
the others. The focus on strategies and adaptation does not imply that we view our actors
as  hyper-rationalistic  entities,  carefully  choosing  their  next  moves  based  on  careful
assessments of opportunities and threats,  weaknesses and strengths.  On the contrary,
we assume that strategies such as those we describe are behavioral patterns that have
developed through adaptation to the social environment.
It is easier to enumerate what we did not find. We did not find the “community” as an
actor that,  for the sake of the common good,  imposes rules of behavior and controls
compliance  with them.  As we  have  seen,  understanding the  networks of relations is
crucial  for the interpretation of facts and for postulating hypotheses about motivations
and choices. But networks are one thing and the “community”, in the sense that it is often
used in the literature (“a territorial group of people with a common mode of living striving
for a common objective”, as quoted by Macfarlane, 1977, but see the critique of Calhoun,
1978), is something very different (Wellman and Wetherell, 1996). In other words, in our
analysis, we find no instance where it would make sense to use a formulation such as “the
community  accepted,  promoted,  denounced,  etc…  anything”.  On  the  contrary,  the
community seems to emerge only as an abstraction promoted by external entities, such
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Portuguese_Brazilian_Studies/ejph/html/issue4/html/carvalho_main.html
as episcopal justice, that choose random witnesses to obtain the “community’s” view of
local misbehavior.
Neither do we see the “community” as a traditional  set  of values and understandings
resisting the externally imposed formalization of law and moral concepts. In Norway, for
instance, it has been argued that the traditional concept of marriage as a private contract
resisted  the  formalization  brought  by  the  state  and  the  church,  and  so  what  were
registered as  illegitimate  births  were,  from the  point  of view of the  population,  the
offspring of perfectly acceptable relationships (Sogner 1978). In our examples, it is the
contrary  that  happens.  External  entities  such  as  the  visitador,  or  the  ecclesiastical
courts,  were used as unwitting partners in personal or family strategies,  as we saw in
José’s  family’s  backlash  against  his  marriage  plans.  If  we  needed  an  operational
definition of community that is coherent with this perspective,  it would be as “a set of
people that depend and compete for the same resources, developing mutually adaptive
strategies” – and thus close to the concept of a “complex adaptive system” of recent
complexity theory (Holland, 1995).
We also have difficulty in discussing a “bastardy prone sub society” as a special  social
group that would be immune to the constraints of “morality”. We rather find “immorality”
evenly distributed where it  makes sense for individual  strategies.  The fact  that many
cases relate to clearly socially  unbalanced relations also argues against the idea of a
social  group  with  an  “endogenous  immoral  attitude”.  In  that  respect,  there  are
similarities with data from Catholic Ireland in the 19th century (Connolly, 1979).
We  cannot  ignore,  of  course,  that  certain  combinations  of gender  and  social  status
contribute in a very powerful way towards the shaping of moral choices. For instance, we
find no female member of the elite involved in these cases,  neither in Soure nor in the
many hundreds of denunciations found in the devassas of other parishes. But again,  in
our view, this is more easily explained in terms of strategies than in terms of global social
determinism: the law allowed parents to disinherit a daughter under 25 years of age who
slept with or married an unapproved man (Ordenações, liv. IV, tit. LXXXVIII). So, if you
were a potential heiress, there were strong arguments in favor of a strict moral behavior.
In more general  terms,  we believe our results confirm the value of a micro-historical
approach to problems that  relate  to  general  questions of continuity  and change.  The
cross-linking of different sources and the detailed analysis of the networks that developed
around people  involved in especially  significant  cases provided valuable  insights into
strategies and motivations. But we also subscribe strongly to the idea that such studies
should not be hostage to general questions, and should rather profit from the wealth of
information  available  in  order  to  bring  forward  new  dimensions  in  the  questions
addressed, as was extensively argued by Magnússon (Magnússon, 2003).
As the evidence of the difficulties of articulating the micro and macro levels accumulates,
new approaches are required. We argued elsewhere that it is time for history to look to
new paradigms coming from the field of Complexity  Sciences,  where the questions of
complexity,  adaptation and the  emergence  of persistent  structures  are  dealt  with in
frameworks that contain many concepts familiar to the historian and where the problem
of interaction between the local and the systemic is central (Carvalho, 1999).
Notes
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1 The baptism says: Aos outo dias do mes de maio de 1695 baptisou de minha comissão o p.e
Theodosio Mendes desta vila a M.a filha de Isabel Rodrigues e de Joseph da Cunha deÇa o qual
a mandou baptizar por sua filha forão pp. Fr. Mel Cristovão aqui beneficiado e D.M.a da Cunha
m.ora na sua quinta do Sobral e a may desta menina batisada mora no sobra de q fiz este q
assignei dia e era ut supra. (On the 8th of May 8th, 1695, baptized by my commision the priest
Theodosio  Mendes of  Soure,  commissioned  by me,  baptized  of  Soure,  Mary,  the daughter of
Isabel Rodrigues and of  Joseph da  Cunha  de Sá, who had her baptized as his daughter,  the
godparents were friar Manuel Cristovão, beneficiado [clergyman member of  the parish chapter]
and Lady Maria da Cunha, living at her farm/estate of Sobral and the mother of this baptized
childlives  at  Sobral,  from whichat  I  made this  register,  day and  month  ut  supra).  A.U.C.,
Baptismos de Soure, 1681-1720.   The true meaning of  this simple baptism could easily pass
unnoticed if it was not for the cross-linking of sources that allows us to grasp the nature of the
relationship between Isabel and José, the fact that the priest was the brother of José’s wife, and
Lady that Maria was   José’s mother, and also the fact that Isabel had married another man five
months beforeearlier.  The pieces of  this  puzzle were scattered  in  throughout parish  registers,
genealogies,  notarial records,  episcopal visitations and  in  the holy order records of  Teodósio
Mendes. There is no such thing as irrelevant information.
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